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iAHORA DICEN QUE Los
GUATEMALTECOS SoMos GENOCIDAS!
Now THEY WILL SEE US
AS GENOCIDAL!-





In the thirty-six years between 1960 and 1996 it is estimated that more
than 200,000 Guatemalans were killed, raped, and/or "disappeared." In-
ternational commissions have determined that nearly half of these killings
occurred between 1980 and 1983, during the de facto presidency of Efrain
Rios Montt. On May 10, 2013, Rios Montt became the first former head of
state to ever be tried and convicted of genocide by a domestic court, specifi-
cally on charges of massacring 1,771 members of the indigenous lxil group.
On May 20, 2013, that conviction was stayed by Guatemala's Court of
Constitutionality in a three against two decision on a number of contested
procedural technicalities, stirring strong dissents both within and outside
the Court. This article will trace a brief history of the internal armed con-
flict that gave rise to one of the grossest abuses of human rights in the
Western hemisphere, the trial proceedings of a historic case of first impres-
sion, and the ultimate decision by the Court of Constitutionality that de-
railed it all. Finally, this article will comment on the juridical and human
rights implications of the Court's decision.
Tony Godfrey is a J.D. Candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law, class of 2015.
He earned his B.A. in English Literature and Political Science, cum laude, from
Abilene Christian University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE ATROCITIESJN 1999 the UN-led Guatemala Comisi6n para el Esclarecimiento His-
t6rico, or Historical Truth Commission (CEH), published the final re-
port it was originally commissioned to write in 1994.1 This report,
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, utilized testimony from as many as 9,000
witnesses 2 to present documented stories of over 42,000 specific deaths
and atrocities during the thirty-six year internal armed conflict. 3
Throughout its report, the Commission was clear that the violence could
only be explained as attempted genocide, "since babies could not make
war against a well-equipped armed force."'4 Extrapolating from its case
studies, the Commission's final report estimated at least 200,000 deaths
and victims of forced disappearances, with 81 percent of these occurring
from 1981 to 1983. 5 Eighty-three percent of those killed were of indige-
nous Maya descent, and 17 percent were Latino.6 The CEH also found
that of all the human rights violations it could investigate, 93 percent
were committed by the state, and 3 percent by the guerrillas. 7 But, the
CEH never made a formal declaration of blame, as its mandate only in-
cluded documenting the extensive and inexplicable loss of life during the
internal conflict.8
According to the CEH report, in March 1982 a military junta led by
then-General Efrafn Rfos Montt enacted a coup d'tat that gave it de
facto power over the country. 9 As leader of this junta, Rfos Montt was
Guatemala's head of state until August 1983 when a change of military
command passed the power to General Oscar Meija Victores. 10 General
Victores issued a formal decree that provided general amnesty to any and
all responsible or accused of responsibility for political crimes between
March 23, 1982, and January 14, 1986, Victores's last day in power.1
1. Press Release, Press Conference by Members of Guatemalan Historical Clarifica-
tion Comm'n, U.N. Press Briefing 19990301 (Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://
www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/1999/19990301.guate.brf.html.
2. Id.
3. COMM'N FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, GUATEMALA: MEMORY OF SILENCE 17
(1999).
4. Press Conference by Members of Guatemalan Historical Clarification Comm'n,
supra note 2, at 2.
5. Efrain Rios Montt & Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez before the National Courts of
Guatemala Background, INT'L JUSTICE MONITOR, http://www.riosmontt-trial.org/
trial-background/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter INT'L JUSTICE
MONITOR].
6. COMM'N FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, supra note 3, at 17.
7. Id. at 86.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 80.
10. Id.
11. Amnesty Law, Decree 8-86 (1986) (Guat.); see also Byron Rolando Visquez, Rios
Montt se acerca a amnist(a, segtin Corte de Constitucionalidad [Rioss Montt is Ap-
proaching Amnesty Depending on Constitutional Court], PRENSA LIBRE [FREE
PRESS] (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/usticia/riosmontt-
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Forty-eight percent of the total human rights violations in Guatemala oc-
curred during 1982 alone. 1
2
B. HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONALLY
AND DOMESTICALLY
Guatemala is by no means the only country to have experienced gross
human rights atrocities 13 and Rfos Montt would not be the first former
head of state to be tried for human rights atrocities. The highly publi-
cized case of former Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, readily
springs to mind.14 Such prosecutions have been slowly mounting in to
what some scholars have called a "justice cascade" since Pinochet's arrest
in 1998.15
When prosecuting members of state for human rights abuses, three
fundamental legal avenues are utilized.' 6 The first is international-multi-
lateral tribunals organized by multinational organizations like the United
Nations.17 A well-known example of purely international accountability
is the International Criminal Court (ICC). 18 This is also seen in "hybrid
courts," formed by special tribunals organized by multinational organiza-
tions, as used in the prosecution of Charles Taylor by the Special Court
for Sierra Leone.' 9 The second is a purely foreign prosecution, such as
the case of Augusto Pinochet, tried in the United Kingdom under its
laws.20 Finally, there are the more traditional routes of domestic
prosecution. 2 1
The domestic route to accountability was the only viable road to the
prosecution of Rfos Montt due to domestic and international Guatemalan
obligations.2 2 The final ceasefire in the decades-long civil war came in
1996 with the culmination of a number of accords and agreements signed
over several years, known as the Agreement for a Firm and Lasting
amnistia-corte de constitucionalidad-juicio-genocidio-cc-masacre 0_1016298381
.html# (quoting the Content Act of 1986).
12. IrNT'L JUSTICE MON[rOR, supra note 5.
13. See HOTEL RWANDA (United Artists 2004).
14. David Connett, John Hooper & Peter Beaumont, Pinochet Arrested in London,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 1998), http://www.theguardian.com/world/1998/oct/18/
pinochet.chile.
15. KATHRYN SIKKINK, TinE JUSTICE CASCADE: How HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS
ARE CHANGING WORLD PoLrics 3, 5 (2011).
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4-5; see Owen Bowcott, Charles Taylor's 50-Year Sentence Upheld at War
Crimes Tribunal, Tir GUAIu3AN (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/201 3/sep/26/charles-taylor-liberian-president-sentence-upheld.
20. Id. at 4-5
21. SIKKINK, supra note 15, at 5.
22. See Christina M. Fetterhoff, Rios Montt Genocide Trial Tests Durability of Domes-
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Peace.23 A key component of these accords, the Comprehensive Agree-
ment on Human Rights, was signed on March 29, 1994,24 and provided a
commitment by the government to respect "human rights and interna-
tional treaties, conventions and other instruments. ' 25 In keeping with
these accords, Article 16 of the Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure
requires domestic courts and tribunals to fulfill Guatemala's commit-
ments to protect human rights and enforce its obligations under interna-
tional treaties and laws.26 These pledges to protect human rights and a
legal obligation for domestic courts to fulfill the obligations of those
pledges presented a clear, but restricted, route of domestic accountability
for human rights abuses.
This domestic requirement of accountability has posed a particular
problem for Guatemala: impunity. General Victores's Amnesty Decree-
Law 8-86, granting amnesty to all who acted during the rule of General
Rfos Montt, was neither the first nor the last act of impunity for state
officials. 27 In 1996, as a part of the final peace accords formally ending
the internal conflict in Guatemala, the Law of National Reconciliation
was passed. 28 This law granted impunity to all perpetrators during the
civil war.29 However, the Law of National Reconciliation expressly ex-
cludes its impunity for acts of genocide.30 In fact, such political amnesty
continues today as a constitutional right of all active state officials.31
Fortunately for Rfos Montt, his participation in the government of
Guatemala did not end in 1982. After his removal as head of state in
1983, Rfos Montt maintained a strong position in government, founding a
political party known as the Guatemala Republican Front and mounted
several presidential campaigns via the party.32 Despite these failed presi-
dential campaigns he was granted immunity as a member of Congress
23. Marcie Mersky, Human Rights in Negotiation peace Agreements 1 (Int'l Council on




25. Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, pmbl., Mar. 29, 1994, (Guat.) avail-
able at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace-agree
ments/guat-hr -940329.pdf.
26. Decreto No. 51-92, Codigo Procesal Penal [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 16
(Guat.).
27. ANNE MANUIzL & ERIc STOVER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GUATEMALA GEI-VrNG
AWAY WrIH MURDFR 5 (1991), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHRRe
ports/guatelmala-getting-away-with-murder-1991.pdf.
28. See Decreto No. 145-1996, 27 Dec. 1996, Ley de Reconciliaci6n Nacional [National
Reconciliation Act] art. 1 (Guat.)
29. Id. art. 2.
30. Id. art. 8.
31. CONSTITUcION POUfTICA DIE LA RI3PUBLICA DIL GUATEMALA [POLITICAL CONSTI-
TU TION OF TiE REPUI3iIC OF GUATEMALA] art. 161(a)-(b), amended by Acuerdo
Legislativo No. 18-93, Nov. 17, 1993; Decreto No. 63-94, Ley Organica del Organ-
ismo Legislativo [Organic Law of the Legislative Branch] art. 54 (Guat).
32. Efrain Rios Montt & Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez before the National Courts of
Guatemala Who's Who, INIr'L JUSTICE MONITOR, http://www.ijmonitor.org/efrain-
rios-montt-and-mauricio-rodriguez-sanchez-whos-who/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
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from 1990 to 2004, and from 2007 to 2012.33 These impunity laws led the
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights to rate Guatemala's im-
punity index at 98 percent; meaning that 98 percent of past human rights
abuses remained unprosecuted in any way.34
C. A PROSECUTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION
On March 19, 2013, after decades of legal wrangling, impunity of Gua-
temalan officials began to take a different course with the prosecution of
Rios Montt for acts of genocide during his time as de facto head of
state.35 The formal criminal indictment charged Rfos Montt with the in-
tended killing of 1,771 Ixils (a Maya sub-group) in 72 separate opera-
tions,36 and displacing 29,000 more. 37 Genocide is defined by the
Guatemalan Criminal Code as the deliberate destruction, total or in part,
of a national, ethnic, or religious group by killing members of the group,
or compulsive displacement of children or adults of the group. 38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. THE FRAMEWORK
To understand the complicated legal and procedural questions of the
pending case staying Rfos Montt's historic conviction, one must appreci-
ate the make-up of the Guatemalan judiciary and the unique, specific
procedural motions argued.
The Constitution of Guatemala establishes a Court of Constitutionality
"whose essential function is the defense of the constitutional order; it acts
as a collegiate tribunal with independence from other organisms of the
State and exercises specific functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and the law in the matter."' 39 One of these functions is to address on
appeal any amparos brought before any of the tribunals of justice.40 An
amparo is a unique type of legal action created by the Constitution that
deals specifically with the "threat, restraint, or violation of the rights
which the Constitution and the laws guarantee. '41 In some ways an
33. Id.
34. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n Human Rights, IAHCR Conducted Visit to
Guat., No. 37/09 (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comuni-
cados/English/2009/37-O9eng.htm.
35. Jerson Ramos, Comienza debate por genocidio contra Efrain Rios Montt [Debate
begins for Genocide Against Efrain Rios Montt], PRENSA LiUBR [FRu-E PRFss]
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.prensalibre.com/justicia/Rios-Montt-acusado-genocid
io-mandato_0_885511628.html.
36. Elisabeth Malkin, Accused of Atrocities, Guatemala's Ex-Dictator Chooses Silence,
N.Y. TiMIES, Jan. 27, 2012, at Al 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/
world/americas/efrain-rios-montt-accused-of-atrocities-in-guatemala.html.
37. Guatemalan Ex-Ruler Rios Montt to Face Genocide Trial, BBC NEws (Jan. 28,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-21238765.
38. Decreto No. 17-73, Codigo Penal de Guat. [Criminal Code of Guat.] art. 376.
39. Constituci6n Polftica de La Reptblica de Guatemala art. 268.
40. Id. art. 272(c).
41. Id. art. 265.
20141
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amparo may be thought of as a distinct action, in the same way that tor-
tious and criminal actions are distinct.
With these two structures in mind, it is also relevant that the court
before which Rfos Montt was tried was not a normal court, but the first
meeting of High-Risk Tribunal A (Tribunal Primero A de Mayor Riesgo),
comprised of Chief Judge Yazmin Barrios, Judge Patricia Bustamante,
and Judge Pablo Xitumul. 42 Because the High-Risk Tribunal A is a crimi-
nal, not constitutional court, any legitimate amparo filed against the spe-
cial tribunal would fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Constitutionality after passing through the intermediary Courts of
Appeals. 43
B. THE CASE PROPER
On May 10, 2013, the special High-Risk Tribunal A handed down a
formal verdict of guilty against Rfos Montt on counts of genocide and
sentenced him to eighty years in prison.44 The verdict came in a weighty
718-page decision from the tribunal.45 Ten days later, on May 20, 2013,
that 718-page decision was stayed by the Court of Constitutionality in a
three to two decision addressing four of the hundreds of amparos filed
over the course of the month-long trial by Rfos Montt's ever-changing
defense counsel.46
C. THE BUILD-UP
On the first day of trial, March 19, 2013, Rfos Montt suddenly replaced
his extensive defense team with a single attorney, Francisco Garcia
Gudiel.47 Gudiel testified that he was asked to take over Rfos Montt's
defense by the defendant himself at 6:00 a.m., a mere two hours before
the trial was set to begin. 48 While the tribunal initially recognized this
bizarre and sudden change in representation, Gudiel repeatedly moved
for the recusal of Chief Judge Barrios based on personal enmity between
Gudiel and Barrios stemming from a previous case. 49 The tribunal con-
sistently rejected Gudiel's call for recusal and ultimately expelled Gudiel
from the courtroom for his outbursts-temporarily leaving the defendant
42. Efrain Rios Montt & Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez before the National Courts of
Guatemala Who's Who, supra note 31.
43. Constituci6n Polftica de La Reptblica de Guatemala art. 272(c).
44. PAULA WORBY, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, GUATEMALA:
BACKGROUND PAPER, Oct. 2013, at 18, available at http://www.acnur.org/t3/
uploads/media/9355.pdf?view=l.
45. Id.
46. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 1 (Guat.), available at http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/
Resolucion-CC-Expl904_PREFI L20130522-0004.pdf.
47. Emi MacLean, Trial Opens with Statements, Prosecution Witnesses, After Defense
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without an attorney.50 Rfos Montt was advised of his right to be repre-
sented by an attorney. 51 After Chief Judge Barrios insisted that a state-
appointed public defender would step in to represent him, Rfos Montt
stepped out of the courtroom to make a phone call and, within minutes,
one of his prior attorneys entered the courtroom to continue his
representation. 52
D. THE ISSUE
The amparo before the Court of Constitutionality that stayed the ver-
dict of Rfos Montt primarily dealt with the events of the first day of
trial, 53 although it is stymied in a bog of procedural technicalities. The
original question before the Court of Constitutionality was the validity of
a ruling by the Third Chamber of the Court of Criminal Appeals on May
9, 2013, finding that the High-Risk Tribunal A's suspension of proceed-
ings from April 19 until the reinstatement of Gudiel as Rfos Montt's de-
fense counsel on April 30 complied with the Third Chamber's April 18
order granting interim relief by suspending the trial and reinstating
Gudiel as Rfos Montt's counsel. 54 A long issue statement, but you read it
correctly: Rfos Montt challenged the Third Chamber's conclusion that the
High-Risk Tribunal A's suspension of trial and reinstatement of his cho-
sen defense counsel complied with its order to the tribunal to suspend
trial and reinstate Rfos Montt's chosen defense counsel.55
Rfos Montt's defense had argued repeatedly that Gudiel's expulsion
from the courtroom on the first day of trial had temporarily denied Rfos
Montt an attorney and it was not until April 30 that the tribunal rein-
stated Gudiel on Rfos Montt's trial team.56 This, the defense argued, not
only deprived Rfos Montt of representation for a few hours, but also of
his own chosen representation for a majority of the trial.57 While this
question had been presented to various appeals courts and the Court of
Constitutionality several times throughout the trial process, the issue ap-
peared resolved when, on April 19, the trial was suspended in accordance




53. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 2.
54. Id. at 4.
55. See id.
56. Amy Ross, More Battles in Rios Montt Genocide Trial Even While Trial Remains
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on April 18,58 and Gudiel was reinstated on April 30.59
In its decision on May 20 the Court of Constitutionality ordered the
trial reset to April 19 due to the tribunal's failure to comply with the
Third Chamber's orders related to Gudiel.60
III. THE MAJORITY'S CRAZY-STRAW OF LOGIC
A. ACCEPTED FACTS BY THE COURT
The Court begins by making explicit findings of fact, pulled from Rfos
Montt's complaint alone.61 As stated previously, the beginnings of this
issue come from Gudiel's expulsion on the first day of trial, as well as a
refusal by the High-Risk Tribunal A to fully process Gudiel's motion for
recusal of the judges on the tribunal.62 Rfos Montt initially appealed this
action by the High-Risk Tribunal A to the Third Chamber of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, and was granted interim relief on April 18.63 In accor-
dance with the ruling of April 18, the High-Risk Tribunal A's ruling on
March 19 expelling Gudiel was to be vacated, and trial suspended until
such time as the ruling was vacated and Gudiel's motions for recusal were
heard by the Tribunal. 64 The Court of Constitutionality pointed out that
in order for the Tribunal to be found in compliance with the Third Cham-
ber's ruling the trial would have to have been suspended by April 19th,
the day the Tribunal was notified of the Third Chamber's grant of interim
protection. 65 Immediately following this conclusion, the majority writes
"it should be noted that, in effect, the underlying criminal proceeding
WAS suspended from the above date [April 19]."66
B. THE RATIONALE
To this point the majority had found that initial rulings of the Tribunal
should be vacated and trial suspended, that trial was suspended at the
appropriate time, and the initial rulings were then vacated. But this was
not enough for the majority to find compliance.
It should be noted that, in effect, the underlying criminal proceeding
was suspended from the above date, but that suspension was not due
to compliance of interim relief decreed on the 18th [by the Third
Chamber] but decided motu proprio to wait for decisions by the
Constitutional Court regarding the decision of the Tribunal to cancel
58. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 2.
59. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 2069 (Dissent) (Guat.), available at http://www.cc.gob.gt/index.php?op
tion=comcontent&view=article&id=941&Itemid=131.
60. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 13.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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criminal proceedings during the processing of appeal. 67
The majority ruling of the court sets out a necessarily grandiose foun-
dation for its ultimate ruling: if the constitution is not respected, the en-
tire constitutional order will be ruptured. 68 It is with this importance of
the rule of law in mind that the Law of Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and
Constitutionality mandates the clean execution of decisions by the Court
of Constitutionality, "whether original or confirming those of other
courts".69 The Court then relies on its general authority of Article 72 of
the Law of Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and Constitutionality to review not
only judicial actions, but also the rationale behind those actions, even if
they are actions ordered by other superior courts. 70 This is a gross misap-
plication of Article 72, as it not only stretches the implications of the Ar-
ticle for the court, but also misapplies the purpose of Article 72. In fact,
Article 72 sets out the rights of a party aggrieved by a legal procedure or
ruling to present their case to the Court of Constitutionality.7 1 Nonethe-
less, the majority uses this provision to review and ultimately nullify deci-
sions not only for their effects, but the rationale for the actions by a lower
court.
7 2
There is, finally, the issue of the rehearing of defense counsel's motion
for recusal of the judges sitting on the Tribunal.7 3 It is important to note
that the majority opinion expressly uses as its stipulations of facts those
facts presented by Rfos Montt's complaint.74 According to this fact, even
though trial was suspended on April 19 as required, and Gudiel rein-
stated on April 30 before trial began, and the record of the court indi-
cated that at the hearing of April 30 Gudiel re-urged his motion for
recusal, 75 the majority found that the Tribunal did not rehear the motion
as ordered. On this issue the majority appeals to Article 67 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.7 6 Again, the majority appears to misapply the Arti-
cle. Article 67 sets out the proper procedure for presenting and hearing a
motion for recusal, and if such a motion is presented at a hearing, "and
that motion is rejected as manifestly unfounded, the hearing shall con-
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 5-6.
70. Id. at 13.
71. See Ley de Amparo, Exhibici6n Personaly de Constitucionalidad [Law of Amparo,
Habeus Corpus, and the Constitution], available at http://www.oj.gob.gt/es/
queesoj/estructuraoj/unidadesadministrativas/centroanalisisdocumentacionjudicial/
cds/CDs%201eyes/2006/pdfs/normativa/D0O01-86.pdf.
72. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 13.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id. at 1.
75. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013 (Dissent), 2067 ("in the audio recording of the respective hearing is
found that this motion was only against the decision of the trial court ordering the
expulsion of counsel, but not against the decision regarding disqualification").
76. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 16-17.
2014]
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tinue. ' ' 77 There is nothing, based on the majority decision, to indicate
that the motion was not heard and rejected as manifestly unfounded. On
the contrary, as the dissents point out, the record indicates that this is
exactly what happened. 78
C. THE ANNULMENT
Based upon its rationale, the majority ultimately affirms the complaint
made by Rfos Montt against the Third Chamber. 79 In order to remedy
the constitutional violations brought to light by Rfos Montt's complaint,
the court annuls all proceedings from April 18 and onward. 80 While trial
was suspended from April 19 to April 30, proceedings did begin again
after April 30, with a final verdict rendered on May 10.81 With the major-
ity's ruling, those final proceedings and verdict no longer legally exist. It
is this portion of the majority's opinion, more than any other that has
caused controversy and spurred such strong dissents from two of the five
judges of the Court of Constitutionality.
1. The Stirring Dissents
Each of the two dissenting judges filed separate opinions that highlight
two major criticisms of the majority opinion and ruling. First, the pur-
pose of an amparo is to protect the constitutional rights of the complain-
ant and, if these rights are found to be violated, they are to be restored
and protected. 82 Second, the amparo action in question is not truly one
of constitutional rights, but one of procedure, and is thus outside the
scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Constitutionality. 83 The two dis-
sents deal with these major concerns in turn.
D. JUDGE ESCOBAR
The purpose of an amparo is to "protect people against threats of viola-
tions of their rights or to restore the same if any violation occurred., 84 In
the instant case, the rights in question are tangentially related to due pro-
cess because the defendant's chosen defense counsel, Gudiel, was ex-
pelled from the trial proceedings. 85 But, Gudiel had already been
reinstated and his motions for recusal of the judges of the Tribunal revis-
ited. Judge Escobar says clearly:
77. Decreto No. 51-92, Codigo Procesal Penal [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 67.
78. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013 (Dissent), 2067.
79. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013, 20.
80. Id.
81. C-01076-2011-00015 of Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y De-
litos Contra el Ambiente. May 10, 2013 (Guat.).
82. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013 (Dissent), 2073.
83. Id. at 2068.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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I believe that this Court's ruling exceeds the issues raised in com-
plaint, given that the guarantee of constitutional justice is the resto-
ration of violated rights, which effectively already happened as a
result of the interim protection granted by this Court, in the records
indicated. The resolution of the majority opinion departs from any
procedural logic. The protection promoted sought a) the restoration
of the defense attorney, and b) the hearing of the disqualification
process. The Tribunal's suspension of the trial addressed these issues
and restored the rights of the complainant. 86
Judge Escobar acknowledges outright the maxim of iura novit curia,
that the Court knows the law and is not limited to the legal arguments in
the initial complaint to justify its analysis.87 But, this maxim does not
empower the Court to grant relief not requested by the petitioner.
88
Judge Escobar does grant to the majority that the Tribunal suspended
hearings not simply to comply with the granting of interim relief of the
order of April 18 by the Third Chamber, but also to receive clarification
from the Court of Constitutionality as to the validity and rationale for
suspending trial proceedings. 89 Such a request for clarification is in line
with Article 55 of the Law of Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Constitution-
ality.90 The Court of Constitutionality, however, remained silent upon
this request for clarification and the Tribunal chose to proceed through
that silence. 91 Now, after failing to receive guidance from the Court of
Constitutionality, and after the completion of trial with a verdict ren-
dered, the Tribunal's actions have been annulled. 92
With an amparo action meant to protect and restore rights of the com-
plainant, it is difficult to understand a ruling that reinstates rights already
reinstated. As the dissent later points out, such a double-reinstatement
comes at the detriment of the rights of another party to these proceedings
that to now have been largely ignored: the victims.
93
While the majority opinion is couched in a grand vision of the impor-
tance of due process, Escobar's dissent points out that the Court's inter-
pretation of Article 2 of the Constitution, wherein the protection of due
process is found, also necessitates a full consideration of the facts to pre-
serve "the confidence of the citizen towards the justice system within a
rule of law."' 94 It is difficult at best to believe that privileging a procedu-
ral issue on the level of a constitutional question at the expense of a de-
cades-long trial process wherein thousands of victims seek justice
86. Id. at 2069.
87. Id. at 2067.
88. Id. at 2068.
89. Id.
90. d at 2067; see also Ley de Amparo, Exhibici6n Personal y de Constitucionalidad
[Law of Amparo, Habeus Corpus, and the Constitution], art. 55.
91. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013 (Dissent), 2068.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2070.
94. Id. at 2071.
20141
346 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
preserves such a confidence in the rule of law.95 With the rights to due
process of the victims in mind, one must not neglect the laws of Guate-
mala itself and the articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure set out to
protect both defendants and victims. 96
E. JUDGE CORADO
The second dissent does not address the same constitutional issues of
due process that the majority relies on so heartily, or the protection of the
unrepresented victims in the majority opinion. Instead, Judge Corado's
criticism stems from two prongs.
The first is that the relief granted in an amparo action "should not cre-
ate consequences that make worse the status of those named as parties in
the underlying criminal prosecution. ' 97 While this may seem an echo of
Judge Escobar's cries for justice and respect of the victims at the trial, he
instead focuses on the overreaction of the majority opinion to the ques-
tion at hand.98 Judge Corado looks to the Court of Constitutionality's
own prior decisions, highlighting the importance of a proportional ap-
proach to judgment, writing "the principle of proportionality involves an-
alyzing the suitability of the employee's need and the weighty implication
of a strict sentence." 99 Without a clear showing of continued damages to
the complainant after April 19th, one cannot justify a total annulment of
a completed criminal process in which a verdict has been rendered. 100
Even if the majority is right in its finding of a continued violation of
rights, there are other, more traditional remedies for the specific injus-
tices: namely, sanctions against the judges who allegedly refused to com-
ply completely with the orders of their superior courts. 101
The second prong of Judge Corado's dissent hits at the heart of the
jurisdiction of the Court of Constitutionality, namely, issues of constitu-
tional protection. 10 2 In line with his prior reasoning, Judge Corado points
out that the complaint at issue before the Court of Constitutionality did
not arise from the execution of the Tribunal's suspension of trial and rein-
statement of Gudiel, but from its explanation of its rationale behind its
execution. 0 3 With this in mind, not only is the purpose of the amparo to
protect complainants from constitutional violations, as argued so emphat-
ically by Judge Escobar, but also when complaints have remedies availa-
ble to other normal legal procedures those processes ought to take
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2072; see Decreto No. 51-92, Codigo Procesal Penal [Criminal Code of Pro-
cedure], art. 3, 4, 13, 16, 19, 21.
97. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Court of Constitutionality], Expediente [Record]
1904-2013 (Dissent), 2073.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2074 (quoting Judgment 3-2011).
100. Id.
101. Id.at 2073.
102. Id. at 2074.
103. Id.
NOW THEY WILL SEE US AS GENOCIDAL!
precedence.' 04 The Court of Constitutionality itself pointed out this same
idea, and the potential abuse of the amparo should it be utilized as a
procedural play, rather than a constitutional protection.
[It is] not the responsibility of amparo to replace the legal protection
offered by the ordinary justice system, so that when claimed in this
way it guarantees a violation occurring in a judicial process that must
be avoided in order to divert constitutional justice to the improper
purpose of reviewing the merits of the resolutions of ordinary courts,
as the Court of Amparo does not act to decide the material and/or
procedural claims of the parties, but are to examine whether or not
the rights that the Constitution and applicable laws warrant and pro-
vide maximum protection of those rights.' 0
5
This purpose of amparo in mind, Judge Corado considers the issue-
the validity of the Third Chamber's determination that the Tribunal ade-
quately executed its order to suspend trial and reinstate defense counsel
Gudiel after it suspended trial and reinstated defense counsel Gudiel-to
be a procedural question left to normal legal processes, and not an issue




Unfortunately, the next steps in light of the majority's opinion are hazy
at best, and pose a number of problems should the trial move forward.
One of the clearest problems with the Court of Constitutionality's trial
reset ruling is that a verdict had already been read, and the defendant
found guilty. This does not present an ongoing trial in the middle of a
process, but a now guilty defendant. The termination of the trial removes
the amparo as the proper method of remedy, and makes a special appeal
of the verdict itself, perhaps in conjunction with an amparo, the proper
means of challenging the tribunal's verdict.' 0 7 The Court of Constitution-
ality's purposeful availment of the knowledge of the verdict having been
read calls a great deal of its decision into question, not the least of which
the procedural basis upon which it ruled.
Perhaps most important are the problems faced by the prosecution and
the unrepresented victims of the Ixil groups throughout these procedural
mazes. During the initial trial, 98 victims testified to the atrocities exper-
ienced by themselves, their families, and their friends.' 0 8 The ability to
reconvene such a large number of witnesses-spread throughout rural ar-
104. Id. at 2075.
105. Id. at 2076.
106. Id.
107. Decreto No. 51-92, Codigo Procesal Penal [Criminal Code of Procedure], arts.
415-22.
108. David Laconangelo, Rios Montt Trial to Resume in April 2014 While Witness Fear
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eas across Guatemala-was a herculean feat to begin with and may not
be repeatable. Throughout the trial many of Rfos Montt's sympathizers
criticized the proceedings as being anti-Guatemalan, with one prominent
corporation running ads warning that because of the trial the world would
see Guatemala as a state of genocide, saying loudly, "Now they will see us
as genocidal!"' 109 In light of the CEH reports, however, the international
community had concluded long ago that Guatemala had experienced ge-
nocide. What this trial provided was the possibility of the first successful
domestic prosecution of a former head of state by a country formerly rife
with problems of impunity. Now, with the trial in flux and the Court's
ultimate failure to execute its guilty verdict, perhaps the cry should not be
worries of the international community seeing Guatemala as genocidal,
but as ineffective. Or worse, that domestic courts generally may not be
capable of protecting the citizenry against large-scale human rights
abuses despite the "justice cascade."
109. COMIT COORDINAR m7 ASOCIANES AGRICOLAS, COMERCIALFS, INDUSTRIALES,
Y FINANCIERAS [COMMITEE TO COORDINATE AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL, IN-
DUSTRIAL, AND FINANCIAL. AssOcIATIONS], http://www.cacif.org.gt/index.php?op
tion=comcontent&id=1059&Itemid=468 (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
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